Monthly Archives: December 2003

Raštras AB “Lietuvos telekomas” – 2003-12-29 Nr. Nr. 12/29-01 į 2003-10-21 Nr. 01-1-12772003-11-07, Nr. 01-1-1332 2003-11-28, Nr. 01-4-1-014392003-12-11 (be numerio)

p. Kjellis Ove BlomuiAB “Lietuvos telekomas”generaliniam direktoriui

Kopijos:
p. T. BarakauskuiRyšių reguliavimo tarnybos direktoriui
p. R. StaikūnuiLR Konkurencijos tarybos pirmininkui

2003-12-29 Nr. 12/29-01
į
2003-10-21 Nr. 01-1-12772003-11-07 Nr. 01-1-1332 2003-11-28 Nr. 01-4-1-014392003-12-11 (be numerio)
Gerb. p. Blomai,

Dėkojame, kad pagaliau  AB „Lietuvos telekomas“ 2003-11-07 raštu Nr. 01-1-1332 suformulavo Bendrovės atsakymus į atskirus Pretenzijos Nr. 08/25-01 punktus.

Tikimės, kad šio laiško priede Nr. 1 pateikta analizė padės AB „Lietuvos telekomas“ administracijai realiai laikytis ne tik Telekomunikacijos įstatyme nustatytų terminų, bet ir atsakyti į klientų pretenzijas bei užklausas iš esmės.

UAB „D.B.S. Ltd., Pte.“ detaliai išnagrinėjo Jūsų atsakymus ir pateikia savo faktus bei paaiškinimus šio laiško priede Nr. 2.

UAB „D.B.S. Ltd., Pte.“ tikisi, kad AB „Lietuvos telekomas“ artimiausiu laiku patenkins mūsų (2003 09 05 Nr. 09/05-04) prašymą ir pateiks tikslios žalos sumai paskaičiuoti reikalingus duomenis t.y. 1998, 1999, 2000 bei 2001 mm. gautų pajamų sumas iš Internet paslaugos teikimo; 1998, 1999 mm. pajamų sumas už prisijungimo prie Internet tinklo komutuojamu kanalu, t.t. pajamų sumas už fiksuotos telefonijos paslaugas; gautų pajamų sumas už paslaugų teikimą, naudojant UAB „D.B.S. Ltd., Pte.“ priklausantį tinklą. UAB „D.B.S. Ltd., Pte.“ taip pat laukia Jūsų operatyvaus atsakymo į minetome laiške  suformuluotus konkrečius klausimus:

a) Ar AB “Lietuvos telekomas” iš esmės pripažįsta pateiktos pretenzijos Nr. 08/25-01 pagrįstumą?

b) Su kokio epizodo pagrįstumu iš pretenzijos Nr. 08/25-01 AB „Lietuvos telekomas“ nesutinka „visumoj“ arba „iš dalies“?

Jeigu AB „Lietuvos telekomas“ nesutinka su pretenzijoje nurodyta žalos suma, UAB „D.B.S. Ltd., Pte.“ lauks iš Jūsų Bendrovės alternatyvios mūsų įmonei padarytos žalos sumos.

Tikimės, kad 2004 metais AB „Lietuvos telekomas“ administracijai pavyks realiais veiksmais iškovoti Lietuvos vartotojų pasitikėjimą, o konkurentams įrodyti, kad bendrovė yra pasirengusi konkuruoti rinkoje civilizuotais metodais.

Pagarbiai, Mudrik Dadašov,prezidentas

Priedai:

1. AB „Lietuvos telekomas“ atsakymų analizė į klientų pateiktas pretenzijas bei užklausas (8 psl.).

2. UAB „D.B.S. Ltd., Pte.“ faktai bei paaiškinimai AB „LIETUVOS TELEKOMAS“ argumentus (2003 11 07  Nr. 01-1-1332) (16 psl.)

EC Accuses TeliaSonera

BRUSSELS, Belgium — Today, the European Commission has sent a so-called statement of objections to TeliaSonera AB. The statement concerns a contract for the construction and operation of a fibre-optic broadband network for the provision of high-speed Internet access and other services on behalf of HSB Malmö, a regional housing association. The Commission takes the view that TeliaSonera’s bid for that contract was intentionally set below cost and did not allow the operator to recover the investments and expenses derived from the provision of infrastructures and services contained in the contract. By setting such a low price, TeliaSonera prevented the development of alternative infrastructure and the entry of competing service providers. TeliaSonera thereby strengthened its dominant positions in the markets for the provision of local broadband infrastructure and the provision of high-speed Internet access.

Competition Commissioner Mario Monti stated that: “Today’s decision to initiate formal proceedings against TeliaSonera should be seen as a sign of the Commission’s continued determination to penalise incumbent telecommunications operators that abuse their market power in order to stifle competition in the broadband field. It is in the interest of the European consumers to prevent this from happening.”

The Commission’s action follows a complaint by B2 Bredband AB (in Sweden this company is best known as Bredbandsbolaget), a Swedish provider of electronic communications networks and services. In 1999, Bredbandsbolaget and Telia (which at the time had not yet merged with Sonera) both bid for a contract with HSB Malmö – the 2nd largest co-operative housing association in Sweden – to provide a brand-new fibre-optic network for the provision of broadband services (mainly, high-speed Internet access) to households in the Malmö region. The contract implied the construction of the network and the provision of services in exclusivity for a period of five years. The contract was awarded to Telia in October 1999.

At the present stage of its investigation, the Commission believes that Telia’s agreement with HSB Malmö constituted so-called predatory pricing. When submitting its bid and signing the contract, Telia could not reasonably have expected to cover the costs incurred by providing the infrastructure and services established in the Telia/HSB Malmö Agreement. Taking into account all known revenues and costs relevant to this Agreement, the Commission has provisionally concluded that under no reasonable assumptions could Telia have expected to recover the investments and expenses derived from the provision of infrastructures and services contained in the contract.

This conclusion is supported by documentary evidence gathered by the Commission at its inspection at the premises of Telia in 2000. The documentary evidence indicates that Telia willingly supported losses in order to pre-empt Bredbandsbolaget’s market expansion.

Telia aimed to prevent alternative providers of infrastructure from entering the market for the provision of broadband networks and services. The development of alternative “last mile” infrastructure thereby creating network competition – is crucial when promoting competition in the electronic communications sector.

Lightreading.com

EC accuses TeliaSonera of abusing dominance

The European Commission has accused Swedish-Finnish TeliaSonera of abusing its dominant position on the Swedish market. The Commission says the company has dumped its broadband prices to knock-out its competitors. Similar EU cases have resulted in SEK 100mn «US$ 13.49mn» fines for European telcos. TeliaSonera says the Commission has studied its pricing from 1999 when all broadband companies were aiming for fast expansion of customer numbers and were offering cheap broadband installation, hoping to make money from the resulting broadband services. The Commission says TeliaSonera’s offer of a broadband connection for only SEK 200 per month does not even cover the company’s costs.

TeliaSonera has two months to reply to the Commission’s complaint.

Svenska Dagbladet

TeliaSonera faces EU investigation over alleged anticompetitive behaviour

Finnish-Swedish telecomms operator TeliaSonera AB is to be investigated by the European Commission for alleged abuse of power in the market for broadband.

The Commission claims that TeliaSonera submitted a below-cost bid for a contract to build and operate a fibre optic broadband network in Sweden in order to block out competing service providers.

The launch of the investigation followed a complaint by rival Swedish company B2 Bredband, reported Reuters.

The European Union Competition Commissioner Mario Monti said in a statement that the decision to initiate formal proceedings against TeliaSonera was a sign of the Commission’s determination to penalise incumbent telecomms operators that abuse their market power in order to stifle competition in the broadband field.

TELECOMWORLDWIRE

TeliaSonera Sweden comments on the Swedish NRA´s proposal for a new calculation model

TeliaSonera Sweden has the following comments to the Swedish NRA  proposal for a new calculation model:

– TeliaSonera Sweden welcomes a new calculation model in accordance with EU recommendations. Two years ago TeliaSonera requested that a new model should be prepared with the objective of providing the correct incitement for investments in networks and technology, says Marie Ehrling, Managing Director of TeliaSonera Sweden.

– There have been serious shortcomings in the earlier methodology and we take it for granted that the NRA will rectify this situation.

Calculations indicate that interconnect pricing between operators for fixed telephony will reduce over time and that this is an expected consequence. It will be to the advantage of all players in the market if the pricing structure for interconnect is the same for all fixed network operators. However, the model gives no indication how TeliaSonera should tackle the present situation in relation to the interconnect pricing imbalance with Tele2 and Vodafone on the mobile side, which is unfair to all customers calling to these network users.

– Cost calculations for access and other network elements increase in the new model and give a more correct incitement for future investments. In what way this could affect consumer prising is at present too early to say.

– There are still a number of unclear components in the new model that we assume that the NRA will rectify. One example is a risk that the model will continue to preserve the present telephone subscription situation. TeliaSonera Sweden recently presented a proposal which ensures that all operators – both TeliaSonera and others – can utilise the copper access network more freely rather than being locked into a legacy situation which impedes continued development in the fixed copper network, says Marie Ehrling

For further information journalists can contact:
TeliaSonera

Commission suspects TeliaSonera (Sweden) of having abused its dominant position in the provision of high-speed Internet access

 

Brussels, 19 december 2003 Today, the European Commission has sent a so-called statement of objections to TeliaSonera AB. The statement concerns a contract for the construction and operation of a fibre-optic broadband network for the provision of high-speed Internet access and other services on behalf of HSB Malmö, a regional housing association. The Commission takes the view that TeliaSonera’s bid for that contract was intentionally set below cost and did not allow the operator to recover the investments and expenses derived from the provision of infrastructures and services contained in the contract. By setting such a low price, TeliaSonera prevented the development of alternative infrastructure and the entry of competing service providers. TeliaSonera thereby strengthened its dominant positions in the markets for the provision of local broadband infrastructure and the provision of high-speed Internet access.

 

Competition Commissioner Mario Monti stated that: “Today’s decision to initiate formal proceedings against TeliaSonera should be seen as a sign of the Commission’s continued determination to penalise incumbent telecommunications operators that abuse their market power in order to stifle competition in the broadband field. It is in the interest of the European consumers to prevent this from happening.”

 

The Commission’s action follows a complaint by B2 Bredband AB (in Sweden this company is best known as Bredbandsbolaget), a Swedish provider of electronic communications networks and services. In 1999, Bredbandsbolaget and Telia (which at the time had not yet merged with Sonera) both bid for a contract with HSB Malmö – the 2nd largest co-operative housing association in Sweden – to provide a brand-new fibre-optic network for the provision of broadband services (mainly, high-speed Internet access) to households in the Malmö region. The contract implied the construction of the network and the provision of services in exclusivity for a period of five years. The contract was awarded to Telia in October 1999.

 

At the present stage of its investigation, the Commission believes that Telia’s agreement with HSB Malmö constituted so-called predatory pricing. When submitting its bid and signing the contract, Telia could not reasonably have expected to cover the costs incurred by providing the infrastructure and services established in the Telia/HSB Malmö Agreement. Taking into account all known revenues and costs relevant to this Agreement, the Commission has provisionally concluded that under no reasonable assumptions could Telia have expected to recover the investments and expenses derived from the provision of infrastructures and services contained in the contract..

 

This conclusion is supported by documentary evidence gathered by the Commission at its inspection at the premises of Telia in 2000. The documentary evidence indicates that Telia willingly supported losses in order to pre-empt Bredbandsbolaget’s market expansion.

 

Telia aimed to prevent alternative providers of infrastructure from entering the market for the provision of broadband networks and services. The development of alternative “last mile” infrastructure thereby creating network competition – is crucial when promoting competition in the electronic communications sector.

 

Earlier this year, the Commission adopted two decisions concerning distorted competition in broadband markets. In May 2003 a decision was adopted against Deutsche Telekom AG in Germany for abusing its dominant position through unfair prices for the provision of local access (see IP/03/717 of 21 May 2003). In July 2003 a decision was adopted against Wanadoo Interactive in France for predatory pricing in the provision of high-speed Internet access to residential customers (see IP/03/1025 of 16 July 2003).

 

Background

 

Procedural

 

A statement of objections contains the preliminary conclusions of the Commission after the analysis of the complaint under Article 82 of the EC Treaty which prohibits abuses of dominant position. TeliaSonera now has two months to present arguments contesting the Commission’s preliminary analysis and may also expand on those arguments at an oral hearing. It is only after this has happened that the Commission will adopt a final position. If the formal proceedings confirm the Commission’s preliminary assessment, TeliaSonera runs the risk of being fined for its anti-competitive behaviour.

 

Factual

 

At the time of the abuse, Telia owned approximately 90% of the local infrastructure susceptible to be used for the provision of high-speed Internet access. This included the traditional telephony network, that could be upgraded for the provision of high-speed Internet access and other advanced services (through DSL technologies), and the cable television network Com Hem that at that time was owned by Telia. Telia’s network reached practically every single household in Sweden.

 

In 1999 the market for the provision of high-speed Internet access services to residential customers was just emerging in Sweden. The incumbent operator Telia could capitalise on its extensive networks of “last mile” infrastructure (e.g. upgraded local telephone loops and cable television) in order to “roll out” its services. B2 had started to build alternative high-capacity local networks to compete for the provision of high-speed Internet access and other advanced services. Telia’s near-monopoly position in the infrastructure market made it easier to extend its dominance to new emerging markets using such infrastructure to conquer market share in the provision of high-speed Internet access for residential customers. In addition, Telia had strong market positions in other service markets using “last mile” infrastructure, such as narrowband Internet access, cable-TV services and fixed telephony services.

 

LRIC – The final hybrid model

19 december 2003 PTS-ER-2003:45

ISSN 1650-9862

LRIC

The final hybrid model

LRIC – The final hybrid model

Post- och telestyrelsen

Preface

In 2001, PTS conducted a review of the calculation models used for calculating cost oriented charges for fixed and mobile interconnection services and unbundled local loops. As a result of this review, work was initiated with the aim of determining cost oriented access and interconnection charges for the fixed telecommunications network.

In spring 2002, PTS initiated the work of developing a new calculation model. The new model is based on the Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) methodology, recommended by the EU-Commission and adopted by the majority of the Member States. The advantage of the LRIC-methodology is that it provides both new operators as well as TeliaSonera with a better basis for making investment decisions, leading to a more effective competition in the long run. PTS has undertaken the work of introducing the new calculation model in cooperation with the operators, who have had the opportunity to participate in the development of the model and comment on the different sub-results developed during the process.

Today, PTS can present the final result of the work in the form of the final calculation model along with the costs of access and interconnection services calculated on the basis of the model.

Stockholm, December 2003

Nils Gunnar Billinger

Director-General

1 Background

During 2001, PTS performed a pre-study regarding cost oriented access and interconnection in Sweden. The purpose of this study was:

• to evaluate the existing models used to calculate cost oriented charges;

• to describe what different methods can be used to calculate cost oriented charges for access and interconnection; and

• to recommend which methods should be used in the future.

The final recommendation in the pre-study was to change the existing calculation models for access and interconnection and instead base cost oriented charges for these services on LRIC plus mark-up. In a public consultation with the Swedish operators this view was generally confirmed.

On this basis, a LRIC process was initiated by the National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS) in May 2002.

2 Objectives of the LRIC process

Objectives

The specific objectives of PTS’s work, implementing LRIC plus mark-up, have been to:

• develop a reliable model that is supported by the industry in order to calculate costs for access and interconnection according to the LRIC-method which is recommended by the Commission; and

• create a regulatory tool for PTS to be used in order to establish cost oriented prices for access and interconnection in the fixed network.

Expected effects

The expected effects of implementing LRIC according to the objectives mentioned above are to:

• Encourage the use of existing facilities of the SMP operator where this is economically desirable, avoiding inefficient duplication of infrastructure costs by new entrants (incentive to buy);

• Encourage investment in new facilities where this is economically justified by

1. new entrants investing in competing infrastructure

2. the SMP operator upgrading and expanding its networks (incentive to build);

• Increase the transparency of the cost calculations underlying the access and interconnection charges; and

• Increase predictability for both the SMP operator and the other operators with regards to future determination of access and interconnection charges.

When access and interconnection charges are based on LRIC they do not distort the build/buy decision of new entrants – they will be encouraged to use existing facilities if it is economically desirable to do so. Just as important, LRIC-based access and interconnection charges also mean retaining investment incentive for incumbents to upgrade or extend the existing network when new technology is available.

When charges are set on the basis of LRIC, infrastructure competition is encouraged in those areas where it is efficient to have competing infrastructure, whereas service competition is encouraged in those areas where the investment in competing infrastructure is not efficient.

3 Methodology

To send the right investment signals and promote efficient competition, prices should reflect the LRIC of an efficient operator facing the demand of the existing SMP operator (currently this means TeliaSonera). The efficient operator is defined as the theoretical operator that would exist if it were in a fully competitive market in Sweden, but with the same scope and demand of the existing SMP operator.

This approach ensures that the economies of scale and scope are divided equally between the SMP operator and the interconnecting operators allowing the interconnecting operators to compete with the SMP operator on equal terms.

4 Process

At an early stage of the process, PTS released for discussion a proposed timetable showing how each of the main activities would be conducted. This timetable was discussed and accepted by the parties. The key dates were as follows:

May 2002 – September 2002: Structuring the process

August 2002 – March 2003: BU modelling

August 2002 – June 2003: TD modelling

June 2003 – December 2003: Reconciliation and hybrid modelling

Consultations with the Swedish telecommunication industry have been conducted at all stages of the process and opportunities have been given to influence the model structure and features.

To ensure a maximum level of transparency into the process an LRIC web site was established, where all relevant information developed during the process has been published.

Model Reference Paper – Guidelines for the modelling work

Subsequent to an industry consultation, PTS published on 13 September 2002 a Model Reference Paper (MRP) specifying criteria and guidelines for the development of two costs models to be used for determining the Long Run Incremental Costs (LRIC) of providing (wholesale) access, interconnection and co-location services in Sweden:

• A bottom-up model to be developed by PTS in co-operation with the industry; and

• A top-down model to be developed by TeliaSonera.

The MRP has been published on the PTS web site.

Bottom-up model

The bottom-up model was developed in a Bottom-Up Working Group (BUWG), chaired by PTS. All operators were invited to participate in the working group. A team of PTS’ consultants, the so-called Bottom-Up Modelling Team (BUMT), established under the BUWG, undertook the technical modelling work. PTS did not form part of the BUMT.

A draft version of the bottom-up model was subject to industry consultation before the final version of the bottom-up model was published on 27 June 2003. The final model was populated with data supplied by the industry and the consultants.

Top-down model

On 1 July 2003, TeliaSonera delivered the top-down model to PTS. TeliaSonera did not provide PTS with the actual model but with supporting documentation and a selection of underlying calculations. The material was reviewed by PTS and its consultants to check for compliance with the criteria and guidelines of the MRP. Following this review, TeliaSonera was requested to provide PTS with a revised version of the model and, in particular, to elaborate on the documentation of the model. The top-down model was audited by Ernst & Young.

Reconciliation

Following the delivery of the revised top-down model, PTS reconciled the results of the two models in a draft reconciliation report and invited the industry to comment on the findings and proposed changes to the bottom-up model. Following the industry consultation, a final reconciliation report was published

on10 October 2003 on the PTS web site. This report presents the findings of the reconciliation exercise, highlighting the differences between the two models andpresenting PTS’ initial view on the way forward in the hybrid-modelling phase and where appropriate requesting additional information from the industry.

Judgements in the hybrid-modelling phase

The reconciliation process has formed the basis for PTS judgement in the hybrid modelling phase.

When making choices on the most appropriate methodology to use in the hybrid model, PTS has considered the following key factors:

• The overall intentions of the new electronic communications legislation (2003:389).

• Practical and technical feasibility of the modelled network

• Criteria and guidelines of the MRP, which are not specific to the bottom-up or top-down model.

• Documentation provided for bottom-up and top-down figures respectively.

• International experience with LRIC modelling.

• Transparency of the hybrid model.

Draft hybrid model

A draft hybrid model was published for public consultation on 31 October 2003. The consultation responses have been published on the PTS website and are addressed in a separate consultation note on the draft hybrid model published together with this report.

All the changes made to the draft hybrid model following the public consultation have been documented in appendix 1 to the model documentation, accompanying the final hybrid model. PTS has also updated the model with estimated demand for 2003.

5 Results – the final hybrid model

The final hybrid model consists of the following material, annexed to this report:

• LRIC hybrid model TRUE version 1.2 (Excel) (Confidential)

• LRIC hybrid model PUBLIC version 1.2 (Excel)

• Model Documentation (Word document)

• User guide (Word document)

• Results of LRIC hybrid model (Word document).

In the public version of the hybrid model, confidential data have been randomized or “camouflaged” in such a manner that all results, based on these data, will not differ more than 5% from the results, calculated from the real data (presented in the note on results).

It should be emphasized that the hybrid model estimates costs – not prices. Based on these costs estimated, TeliaSonera will determine prices in accordance with a LRIC pricing methodology prescribed by PTS. A draft pricing methodology was published by PTS on 7 November 2003 for public consultation and updated for shared access on 14 November 2003. The final pricing methodology will be published in January 2004.

PTS

EU launches TeliaSonera internet inquiry

European Commission regulators on Friday filed a competition inquiry into the internet operations of Swedish telecommunications giant TeliaSonera.

The investigation focuses on a contract with regional housing association HSB Malmö to provide a fibre-optic network used for high-speed broadband internet access.

Brussels holds concerns over market monopolisation through TS actively setting the contract below cost and preventing taking on investments – so shoring up the market.

“By setting such a low price, TeliaSonera prevented the development of alternative infrastructure and the entry of competing service providers,” added the commission from Brussels.

EU regulators acted on a complaint from Swedish communications rival B2 Bredband (known as Bredbandsbolaget), who joined TS in bidding for the housing contract in 1999.

“The documentary evidence indicates that Telia willingly supported losses in order to pre-empt Bredbandsbolaget’s market expansion,” the EU executive added.

At the time of the ‘abuse’, TS owed approximately 90 per cent of Swedish internet access infrastructure; with a network that “reached practically every single household in Sweden.”

It is not the first time this year that Brussels antitrust teams have come down hard on anti-competitive practice over broadband networks and services.

The commission fined German giant Deutsche Telecom and French internet company Wanadoo in May and July respectively for abusing their market position over the provision of internet services.

As stage one of antitrust proceedings, TS has two months to respond to the charges before the commission issues a final decision with the threat of fines.

EUpolitix.com

 

 

Telekomas gali netekti biudžetinių įstaigų

Valstybinėms įstaigoms nuo kitų metų leista rinktis fiksuotojo ryšio tiekėją. Tai numatoma vakar Seime priimtose Viešųjų pirkimų įstatymo pataisose.

Priimant pataisas karštos parlamentarų diskusijos kilo dėl fiksuotojo ryšio. Šiuo metu viešųjų pirkimų reikalavimai netaikomi pirkimams, kurie leidžia pirkėjui naudoti visuotinius telekomunikacijų tinklus. “Lietuvos telekomas” kol kas yra vienintelė bendrovė, teikianti fiksuotąjį ryšį, todėl dauguma valstybinių įstaigų yra priverstos naudotis telekomo paslaugomis.

Seimo Ekonomikos komitete balsuojant dėl fiksuotojo ryšio įtraukimo į viešųjų pirkimų sąrašą, ši nuostata buvo prįimta tik vieno balso persvara. Leisti viešajam sektoriui rinktis fiksuotojo ryšio operatorių nenorėjo ir Ūkio ministerija, savo poziciją motyvuodama tuo, kad panašaus teisės akto nėra ES.

Finansų ministerijos duomenimis, per 11 šių metų mėnesių 2 tūkstančiai Lietuvos biudžetinių įstaigų ryšių paslaugoms (telefono pokalbiai, duomenų perdavimas, pašto paslaugos) išleido 54,8 milijono litų. Prognozuojama, kad metų pabaigoje ši suma pasieks 64,3 milijono litų.

“Lietuvos telekomo” atstovai vakar neatskleidė, kokią sumą viešasis sektorius išleidžia telefono pokalbiams. Telekomunikacijų rinkos ekspertų teigimu, biudžeto išlaikomos įstaigos kasmet mažina išlaidas fiksuotajam ryšiui, mat jau kelerius metus iš eilės apkarpomos administravimo išlaidos.

“Savivaldybėms, valstybės įstaigoms laisva konkurencija leistų sutaupyti nemažai lėšų”, – pataisų naudą LŽ aiškino Seimo narys konservatorius Artūras Vazbys. Parlamentaras pridūrė, kad ir ES jau svarstoma viešajam sektoriui, perkant telekomunikacijų paslaugas, taikyti viešųjų pirkimų reikalavimus.

Su telekomo monopoliu Lietuva atsisveikino šių metų sausio 1 dieną, tačiau realios konkurencijos fiksuotojo ryšio rinkoje dar nematyti. Su prekybos tinklu “VP Market” susijusi bendrovė “Eurocom” lapkričio pabaigoje pradėjo siūlyti visas fiksuotojo ryšio paslaugas, tačiau jos rinkos dalis yra nedidelė. “Eurocom” direktoriaus pavaduotojas Arūnas Žubinas teigė, kad jo bendrovė bandys nuvilioti dalį telekomo valstybinių klientų siūlydama pigius pokalbius, tačiau tam kelią užkirsti gali ir konkurentų įtaka.

Mobiliojo ryšio operatorė “Tele2″ paskelbė, kad būsimiems klientams siūlys pigesnius fiksuotojo ryšio pokalbius nei “Lietuvos telekomas”, tačiau kol kas “Tele2″ fiksuotojo ryšio neteikia. Telekomo rinkodaros ir pardavimo direktoriaus pavaduotojas Nerijus Ivanauskas LŽ sakė, kas kad “Lietuvos telekomas” viešojo sektoriaus įstaigas stengsis išlaikyti mažindamas kainas bei siūlydamas gerą paslaugų kokybę.

Mindaugas Biliauskas, “Lietuvos žinios”
2003 gruodžio mėn. 17 d.

PTS orders TeliaSonera to cut access charges

The Swedish National Post and Telecom Agency «PTS» has informed TeliaSonera that its excessive charges to competing operators for accessing the telephone network are not compliant with EU legislation. The Agency has ordered TeliaSonera to correct these charges by 21 January 2004.

Dagens Industri